Mayun’s Fall Strengthens Israel’s Case for a Somaliland Foothold

The Houthi takeover of Mayun Island and Dhubab, reported by Sheba Intelligence on September 11, could strengthen Israel’s case for expanding its security presence in Somaliland, as growing Iranian influence near Bab al-Mandab increases the strategic importance of the African coast. The advance follows diplomatic outreach by Somaliland’s president and Emirati contacts with both the Houthis and Iran, raising questions about regional powers’ earlier assessments of the strait’s future.

Sheba Intelligence cited intelligence sources reporting the takeover and plans to advance toward Al-Arah, under the supervision of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, to consolidate the Houthis’ position around the strait. The report noted that the territorial changes and details of the alleged plan had not been independently verified. ⁠

The advance was preceded by sustained diplomatic activity by Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro.” His itinerary included a visit to Israel in June and departure for the United States on September 3, via the UAE, as part of efforts to expand international ties and recognition. The Hudson Institute also hosted an event on Somaliland’s role as a strategic partner in the Horn of Africa during his American visit.

Proposals to position Somaliland as a maritime security partner also predated Mayun’s fall. On August 23, Israel Hayom, citing an interview with The Economist, reported that Irro was offering foreign powers, including Israel, military basing opportunities at Berbera, linking Red Sea security cooperation to his campaign for wider recognition.

This outreach overlapped with an undisclosed meeting in Abu Dhabi on August 20, reported by Sheba Intelligencek a week later, between Houthi security officials and Emirati intelligence officers. According to a source familiar with the meeting, the UAE offered to bring the Houthis into a new regional framework in exchange for severing ties with Iran and coordinating with the Southern Transitional Council on Yemen’s political and security arrangements. The Houthis reportedly said they would study the proposal. ⁠

On September 12—one day after the Houthis announced full control of Bab al-Mandab—Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed met Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in New Delhi. Reuters reported that the talks addressed regional de-escalation and peace efforts. The timing adds significance to the diplomatic contacts surrounding the advance, although no published evidence establishes that the takeover was discussed.

The Houthis’ latest shipping assurances add another dimension. The group said international navigation would remain safe, with Saudi vessels alone remaining subject to its announced blockade. That wording suggests a retreat from its earlier restrictions on Israeli-linked shipping, although the available reporting does not establish a separate, explicit announcement formally lifting that ban. Reuters⁠

This distinction matters strategically: the Houthis are presenting their immediate maritime restrictions as directed at Saudi Arabia, even as their territorial gains strengthen Iran’s regional leverage and provide Israel with additional grounds to pursue a presence across the Gulf of Aden.

Taken together, these developments raise questions about how early the UAE and Israel anticipated a Houthi advance toward the strait’s commanding positions. Were the proposed arrangements at Berbera a response to longstanding shipping threats, or did they also reflect more specific assessments of an impending military shift?

The available information does not demonstrate that either government had advance knowledge of the operational plan or coordinated its implementation. Indeed, the Emirati proposal described by Sheba Intelligence sought to distance the Houthis from Iran. The timing and substance of these contacts warrant scrutiny, but chronology alone cannot establish complicity.

Nevertheless, expanding Iranian influence through the Houthis could give Israel a stronger rationale for developing security ties with Somaliland under the banner of protecting navigation and monitoring threats. Such cooperation could bring diplomatic gains to authorities in Hargeisa, while increasing the African coast’s exposure to the Yemen conflict and the wider confrontation between Iran and Israel.

The deeper costs fall on Yemen and Somalia as sovereign states. Yemen’s government loses control of strategic territory and risks a diminished role in shaping security arrangements around the strait. Somalia faces expanding foreign partnerships with Somaliland outside Mogadishu’s authority.

The resulting danger is that efforts to protect international shipping could consolidate external influence without restoring the authority of either state. Iran gains leverage through its Yemeni ally, Israel gains a stronger case for a Somaliland foothold, and Yemen and Somalia risk having less say over the security of their own coastlines.