The case involving electrical engineer Ashton Hamed Ellaboudy adds to a series of US investigations and Sheba Intelligence findings documenting Houthi efforts to obtain dual-use chemicals, drone components, missile technology, communications equipment and specialized technical expertise through international networks.

The arrest of a US Department of Energy employee accused of attempting to provide material and technical support to the Houthis has brought renewed attention to international procurement channels used to obtain chemicals, electronic components, communications technology and specialized expertise for the group in Yemen.

US authorities arrested Ashton Hamed Ellaboudy, 51, an electrical engineer from Richland, Washington, on October 1, charging him with attempting to provide material support or resources to the Houthis. His initial federal court appearance was scheduled for October 2.

The allegations are contained in a criminal complaint and have not been proven in court. (justice.gov)

According to the US Department of Justice, Ellaboudy obtained chemical precursors and components commonly used in improvised explosive devices, as well as parts associated with remotely operated aircraft capable of carrying such materials.

Investigators also examined his acquisition of high-concentration nitric acid, a chemical with legitimate industrial applications that can also be used in explosives production.

Travel Through Oman and Yemen

In September 2025, Ellaboudy traveled to Oman using an official US passport he had previously obtained while working with the US Army Corps of Engineers and subsequently entered Yemen, according to US authorities.

Investigators allege that his objective was to reach Houthi-controlled territory.

US reporting on the case indicates that Ellaboudy entered and later left Yemen but did not ultimately reach Sanaa. After returning to the United States, he told Customs and Border Protection officers that he had been conducting official government work in Oman. Investigators later determined that he had no authorized government assignment in the region.

The case subsequently developed into an FBI investigation involving a confidential source whom Ellaboudy believed was working for a Houthi colonel seeking equipment for a mobile communications center in Yemen.

According to the Justice Department, Ellaboudy used his electrical engineering expertise to test and modify solar-powered generators and communications equipment, provided diagrams and instructions for integrating power and communications systems, and researched additional equipment that could improve Houthi communications capabilities.

An Oman-Based Procurement Network

The case follows previous US investigations identifying procurement networks operating through Oman and other countries to acquire military and dual-use components for the Houthis.

In June 2024, the US Treasury Department designated an Oman-based company, International Smart Digital Interface LLC (ISDI), and its operator, Yemeni national Muadh Ahmed Mohammed al-Hayfi, over what Washington described as procurement activities supporting the Houthis.

According to the Treasury Department, al-Hayfi coordinated procurement activities with senior Houthi officials, while ISDI was used to obtain and facilitate the shipment of cruise-missile components, manufacturing equipment and other dual-use materials to Yemen. 

US authorities said components obtained by al-Hayfi’s network from a Chinese supplier were later identified in a Houthi Quds-series cruise missile used in a 2020 attack against a Saudi Aramco facility.

The US designation did not accuse the Omani government of involvement. It identified companies and individuals operating from or through the country.

Chinese Suppliers and Missile Components

Other US sanctions have documented Houthi procurement networks extending into China and Hong Kong.

In July 2024, the Treasury Department identified a network of procurement operatives, shipping companies and suppliers it said was used to acquire military and dual-use equipment from abroad.

The network included Yemeni businessman Maher Yahya Mohammed Mutahar al-Qanai and the Sanaa-based Yemen Telecommunication Asset Company for Information Technology (Y-TAC), which the Treasury said supported Houthi efforts to acquire weapons-related components and equipment. 

A separate Treasury action in August 2024 identified Shenzhen Boyu Imports and Exports as facilitating shipments of dual-use components to Houthi-linked networks.

US authorities also said Shenzhen Jinghon Electronics supplied components used to support Houthi missile and unmanned aerial vehicle production, while Shenzhen Rion Technology shipped hundreds of advanced components used in missile guidance systems. 

US sanctions have also targeted suppliers of chemical precursors.

The Treasury Department said Chinese company Hubei Chica Industrial coordinated with Houthi procurement officials to supply significant quantities of chemical precursors used in the production of ballistic missiles, explosives and other weapons systems in Yemen. 

Iranian Weapons and Maritime Smuggling

Parallel investigations have documented direct Iranian weapons transfers.

A US federal court sentenced Pakistani national Muhammad Pahlawan to 40 years in prison following his conviction in a case involving the transportation of advanced Iranian weapons.

According to the Justice Department, the shipments included components for ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles as well as a warhead.

Pahlawan worked with Iranian individuals linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and participated in smuggling voyages originating from Iran that involved nighttime ship-to-ship transfers. US authorities said weapons involved in the network were destined for the Houthis in Yemen. (justice.gov)

What Sheba Intelligence Previously Tracked

The procurement pattern was examined in detail in a Sheba Intelligence investigation published in July 2026, From Trade to Firepower: How the Houthis Became Iran’s Regional Military Operator.

The investigation documented the movement of engines, electronic circuit boards, sensors, navigation equipment, communications systems and other dual-use components through commercial importers, logistics companies and trading channels before some of the equipment entered Houthi military supply chains.

It also documented seizures by Yemeni authorities involving drone components, radio controllers, electronics and communications and jamming equipment concealed within commercial shipments. 

The investigation found that Houthi procurement had expanded beyond the transfer of complete Iranian-made weapons to include commercially available and dual-use components that could be incorporated into drones, missiles, explosive boats and communications systems in Yemen.

Communications Networks

The communications component of the Ellaboudy case also overlaps with an area recently tracked by Sheba Intelligence.

On September 21, Sheba Intelligence reported the deployment of a hybrid military communications network linked to the IRGC, combining fiber-optic infrastructure with newer wireless communications systems.

Sources told Sheba Intelligence that equipment had been installed at strategic sites, including Jabal Aiban and Attan in Sanaa, and that the network had been used operationally during recent fighting on Yemen’s western coast and around Bab al-Mandab.

The system was designed to provide alternative communications channels and maintain command links if conventional networks were disrupted. 

Sheba Intelligence has separately reported the arrival of Iranian specialists and technical equipment in Houthi-controlled territory, including systems associated with drone detection, signal tracking and communications.

The available evidence does not establish a connection between Ellaboudy and the communications network documented by Sheba Intelligence. However, the US criminal case involves the same general category of capability: power-supported mobile communications equipment intended for Houthi use.

The Ellaboudy case therefore joins a series of documented cases involving chemical precursors, missile and drone components, communications equipment, Iranian weapons transfers and foreign technical expertise obtained or sought for Houthi-controlled Yemen through networks operating outside the country.